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I RECENT CASE NOTES
advantages of such integration may be secured. But in the utilization of the
judicial method of effecting an organization sufficient for discipline and the
maintenance of general standards of conduct and education, the State Bar
Association has led the way and its example in some States is plainly respon-
sible for similar proposals in various other States.
It may be safely stated that never before in the history of the Bar in this
country have the State Bar Associations been so interested in what each
other is doing or so alert to consider the adoption of plans and objectives
which have secured favor in particular organizations. No sooner does one
Association attempt something which appears to be of more than local inter-
est and importance than speakers from that body are in demand by other
bodies which wish to be informed on the subject.
The influence of the State Bar Associations on the American Bar Asso-
ciation is not quite so obvious but is nevertheless as real. Their mere exist-
ence is of course a constant challenge to the national organization to develop
some unifying arrangement which will bring all these virile and important
units into cooperation for the common cause. And the ideas developed in
these Associations are sure sooner or later to find expression in the American
Bar Association and to have due weight in the decisions there reached.
RECENT CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law--Police Power-Compulsory Military in Land Grant
Colleges. Appellants, each the son and grandson of a Methodist minister,
were suspended from the University of California for refusing, for con-
scientious reasons, to enroll in the Local ROTC. They applied to the state
supreme court for a writ of mandate compelling the university to admit them
as students. Appellants' contentions are that the enforcement of the order
of the regents of the university, prescribing instruction in military science
and tactics as a required course deprives them of their "liberty," safeguarded
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The writ was
refused and appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Held, that
the enforcement of an order of the board of regents of a state university
prescribing instruction in military science and tactics as a required course does
not unconstitutionally abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States or deprive any person of liberty without due process of law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.'
This unanimous decision of the supreme court has already caused "a tre-
mendous fluttering in the dovecotes," and, in the opinion of the Committee
on Militarism in Education, is "of a surprizingly reactionary character ;" it
may be "constitutionally correct, but it is remote from approximating ulti-
mate wisdom and justice" and "is deaf to the ground swell of opposition in
the colleges and the country at large to compulsory military training for
another war." The committee goes even further, considering it "an ominous
sign if the Constitution can not adapt itself to the mind and will to peace
which is emerging out of America's religious life.
' 2
Though in his opinion Mr. Justice Butler makes no specific mention of
the source of the state's authority in the matter of requiring compulsory
military training in its university, it does, of course, arise out of the police
power, the power inherent in a government to enact laws to protect order,
1 Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California (1934), 79 L. Ed. Advance
Opinions 159.
2 Literary Digest, Dec. 15, 1934, at 7.
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safety, health, morals, and the general welfare of society.3 The magnitude
and importance of the police power may be inferred from the following
language of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. "Without it the purpose of
civil government could not be attained. It has more to do with the well
being of society than any other power. Properly exercised it is a crowning
beneficence. Improperly exercised it would make of sovereign will a de-
structive despot, superseding and rendering innocuous some of the most
cherished principles of constitutional freedom. '"4 Out of the police power
we find that from a few and necessary regulations we have developed the
largest branch of our law and what is rapidly becoming one of the most vital
questions in our national life. Characterized by indefiniteness, and declared
to be as broad as.the general welfare, it is natural that the extent to which
the law-making body may encroach upon the rights and property of the indi-
vidual in the valid exercise of the police power should always have been a
much controverted question. A vast mass of litigation testifies to this fact.5
However, "a police regulation, correctly speaking, is no more legitimate than
a law in any other field if it in fact violates any principle entrenched in the
constitution." 6  The police power never in fact authorizes an act depriving
a citizen of his liberty or property rights protected under the constitution,
though courts sometimes refer to it in this light.7
Any exercise of the police power must be for a reasonable purpose.8
The police power cannot be used as a cloak for the unreasonable invasion of
personal rights or private property, nor can it be used for the exclusive
benefit of certain individuals or classes. Providing the purpose of a statute
or ordinance is reasonable no constitutional right is abridged. Furthermore,
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the purpose of a law passed under
the police power may properly be separated from a consideration of judicial
precedent. Old cases and old laws dealing with police regulations are of
little help except as they serve to guide the court, and insofar as they expound
general principles applicable to special circumstances. 9 In the final analysis,
the determination of the question must depend on the particular conditions,
and, as is also suggested in the case of State v. Feigold,1 ° "In drawing the
line which separates the field of arbitrary interference with protected rights
of property and freedom in personal action, from that of protective legisla-
tion in behalf of public safety, each case must fall on one or the other side
in accordance with its particular circumstances."
3 Ex Parte Rameriz (1924), 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914; People v. Blanchard (1918),
174 N. Y. S. 276, 105 Misc. Rep. 401; City of Cincinnati v. Harth (1920), 101 Oh. St.
344, 128 N. E. 263; Strawberry Hill Land Corp. v. Starbuck (1918), 124 Va. 71, 97
S. E. 362; Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission (1919), 84 W.
Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557; East Side Levee & Sanitary Dist. v. East St. Louis & Co.
(1917), 279 Ill. 123, 116 N. E. 720; Connecticut Co. v. Town of Stamford (1920), 95
Conn. 26, 110 A. 554; Conger v. Pierce County (1921), 116 Wash. 27, 98 P. 377.
4 Mehlos v. Milwaukee (1914), 156 Wis. 191, 146 N. W. 882.
5 Samuel M. Soref, "The Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Police Power," (1930)
15 Marquette L. Rev. 3.
6 State v. Redmon (1907), 134 Wis. 89, 114 N. W. 137; Cf. Ex Parte White (1915),
82 Tex. Cr. R. 85, 198 S. W. 583; Goldman v. Crowther (1925), 147 Mo. 282; People
v. Witte (1924), 315 Ill. 282, 146 N. E. 178; Durgin v. Minot (1909), 203 Mass. 26, 89
N. E. 144; Enos v. Hauff (1915), 98 Nebr. 245, 152 N. W. 397.
7 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Village of Polos Park (1918), 286 Ill. 400, 121
N. E. 561. The court said, "An act depriving a citizen of his liberty or property rights
cannot be sustained under police power unless the public health, comfort, safety, or
welfare authorizes the enactment."
8 See cases in Notes 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
9 Wrights v. Hart (1905), 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N. E. 404; Samuel M. Soref, "The
Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Police Power," (1930) 15 Marquette L. Rev. 3.
10 (1904), 77 Conn. 326, 59 A. 211.
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As indicated above, the only question brought before the court in the
instant case was whether in the respondents' ordinance there was an obstruc-
tion by the state "to the free exercise" of religion contrary to the United
States Constitution. Before this question arises we must assume, as Mr.
Justice Cardozo points out in his concurring opinion, that "the religious
liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion by the nation is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states, as
the phrase was understood by the founders of the nation, and by the genera-
tions that have followed." As the last would indicate, the guaranty of re-
ligious freedom in the Constitution is not to be interpreted literally. As one
law writer puts it, "All persons professing the Christian religion are equally
entitled to the protection of their religious liberty."' 1  We are a Christian
nation. But even past this, as the courts tell us, "Laws are made for the
government of actions, and, while they cannot interfere with mere religious
beliefs, they may with practices."'1 2 The prohibition of acts inconsistent with
the peace, good order, or safety of the state is not a violation of the consti-
tutional guaranty of the freedom of religion. 13 Constitutional provisions
guaranteeing freedom of religion do not render void a school board regulation
requiring pupils, as a condition of admission to the public schools, to submit
to a physical examination' 4 or vaccination, 15 nor do they render void a statute
requiring male persons applying for a marriage license to file with the clerk
a certificate stating that they are free from acquired venereal disease. 16
Further, legislation against faith healing, 17 blasphemy,' 8 bigamy and polyg-
amy, 19 conducting certain types of activity on Sunday20 have all.been upheld
as regulations proper under the police power.
A multitude of social interests have supported the legislation passed
under the police power in all of these cases. In the principal case the social
interest supporting this exercise of the police power is unquestionably that
in the security of the political institution. 2 ' The first social interest histori-
"1 B. H. Hartogensis, "Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non-
Believers in the United States," and large collection of cases and Statutes, (1930) 39
Yale L. J. 659. See the constitutions of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hamp-
shire. See also the view of Judge Samuel Chase, later Chief Justice of the United
States, in Runkel v. Winemiller (Md. 1799), 4 H. & McH. 429, 450: "All sects and
denominations of Christians are placed upon the same equal footing, and are equally
entitled to protection in their religious liberty." See also Clarence E. Martin, Esq., "The
American Judiciary and Religious Liberty," (1928) 62 Am. Law Rev. 658.
12 McMasters v. State (1922), 21 Old. Cr. R. 218, 207 P. 566.
13 City of St. Louis v. Hellscher (1922), 295 Mo. 293, 242 S. W. 652; Shapiro v.
Lyle (1929), 30 F. (2d) 971.
14 Streich v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ. (1914), 34 S. D. 169, 147 N. W. 779.
15 Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), 197 U. S. 11, 29, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 645,
651; City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt (1918), 109 Tex. 302, 207 S. W. 303;
Cooley, "Constitutional Limitations," at 880 (b) n.; see Mathews v. Bd. of Educ. (1901),
127 Mich. 530, 86 N. W. 1036, and State v. Burdge (1897), 95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 347,
where it is held that this requirement in the absence of imminent danger is void; Cf.
Burns' Ann. St. 1926, § 8168, Const. U. S. Amend. 1, Const. Ind., art. 1, §§ 2-4;
Vonnegut v. Baun (1934), 188 N. E. 677.
16 Peterson v. Widule (1914), 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. AV. 966.
17 People v. Pierson (1903), 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243; Smith v. People (1911),
51 Colo. 2?0, 117 P. 612; State v. Marble (1905), 72 Oh. St. 21, 73 N. E. 1063.
18 State v. Mockus (1921), 120 Me. 84, 113 A. 39.
19 Davis v. Beason (1889), 133 U. S. 333; see 7 C. J., Bigamy, sec. 2.
20 State v. Blair (1930), 130 Kan. 863; Komen v. City of St. Louis (1927), 289
S. V. 838; Elliot v. State (1926), 242 P. 340; see Cooley, "Constitutional Limitations,"
at 859 and cases cited; see Benjamin G. Reeder, "A Monograph on Religious Freedom,"
(1925) 31 W. Va. L. Q. 192; Cf. City of Pineville v. Marshall (1928), 222 Ky. 4, 299
S. W. 1072; City of Louisiana v. Bottoms (1928), 300 S. W. 316.
21 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343, 445; Willis, "Introduction to Anglo-American Law," at 17;
Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159.
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cally recognized was that in the preservation of the peace, out of which
powers necessarily accrued to the state. 22 Out of this larger historical social
interest has come our present primary social interest in the security of the
political institution, recognized in the separate states in the form of the police
power. In the light of this particular social interest the police powers of the
state are exceedingly broad, and laws enacted for its protection may be harsh
and oppressive without contravening constitutional inhibition, that is, they
may still be reasonable in the light of their purpose.23 When the liberties of
the constitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history and
judicial interpretation it must be clear that instruction in military science,
unaccompanied by any pledge of military service, is not an interference by
the state with the free exercise of religion.
The appellants then were wrong in their assertion of an absolute right of
personal liberty. No one has such a right. All personal liberty is subject
to a proper exercise of the police power. If they had contended that the
kind of social control exercised in this case was not a proper exercise of the
police power they also would have been wrong, since there was a sufficient
social interest for it. Their only possible contention would have had to be
that even though there was a sufficient social interest for this form of social
control the particular method employed in this case to protect it was not
accomplishing any results and therefore was unreasonable as a matter of
method or form. A reasonable relation must exist between the character of
the legislation and the policy to be subserved.24 That relationship has been
expressed in various forms. In Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, 25 the court said, "The state cannot exercise its
police powers arbitrarily and despotically, nor unless there exists a reason-
able relation between the character of the legislation and the policy to be
subserved." "In Welch v. Swasey,2 6 the court similarly held that statutes
passed in the exercise of the police power should be so tested by the courts
as to see "whether they are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the
purpose on which the constitutional authority rests." Every police regulation
must answer for its legitimacy at the bar of reasonableness, not only as to
purpose but also as to method and form adapted to that purpose.2 7
The question of reasonableness of method need not, of course, be intro-
duced where a law is clearly violative of some constitutional restriction so
that its purpose is unreasonable. And, since a statute or ordinance may
satisfy the criterion of reasonableness of method and still be invalidated
because of some constitutional prohibition, it is best, wherever possible, to
keep the matter of reasonableness of method separate and distinct from
constitutional considerations. 28
In the instant case appellants by their contentions regarding their religious
liberty alone and without regard to the necessary reasonable character of the
22 Willis, op. cit., at 17.
23 Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Town of Calhoun (1923), 287 F. 381.
24 Lawton v. Steele (1894), 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499; Weaver v. Palmer Bros.
Co. (1926), 270 U. S. 402; Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco (1910), 216 U. S.
358; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922), 260 U.. S. 393; Smith v. Texas (1914),
233 U. S. 630; City of Aurora v. Burns (1926), 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784; Appeal of
White (1926), 287 Pa. 256, 134 Atl. 409; Barrett v. State (1917), 220 N. Y. 423, 116
N. E. 99; United States v. Cohen (1920), 268 F. 420; Young v. Lemieux (1907), 79
Conn. 440, 65 Atl. 436; State v. Wagener (1890), 77 Minn. 483, 80 N. W. 635; Gaines
& Co. v. Holmes (1922), 154 Ga. 344, 114 S. E. 327.
25 (1924), 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571.
26 (1907), 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745.
27 Samuel M. Soref, "The Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Police Power," (1930)
15 Marquette L. Rev. 3.
28 Ibid.
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relation between the order of the regents and the policy to be subserved
failed to occasion the court's consideration of this problem in this particular
exercise of the police power. We don't presume to suggest that had the
appellants included this problem in their contentions the result would have
been different in the instant case, more especially in view of the presumption
in favor of reasonableness. 29 However, we do submit that the decision of
the court is entirely sound on the facts so far as they relate to police power,
and the "fluttering of the dovecotes," referred to above, and vain mutterings
against the Supreme Court and the Constitution by agitators and reformers
grow largely out of an ignorance of the issues here before the court.
Compulsory military training in the first two years of the college cur-
riculum so far as it relates to a reasonable means of accomplishing a socially
desirable result is at least vulnerable.30 Besides the opposition to it which
has come from conscientious objectors there is that which comes from stu-
dents and their instructors who regard it as a waste of time and an incon-
gruity in an institution devoted to the peaceful arts. They argue that only
a minor fraction of ROTC cadets joins the Organized Reserve after gradua-
tion and that a still smaller fraction remains in it; that the training is wholly
inadequate to the making of fighters for modern warfare, and that mean-
while it cuts into the pursuit of other subjects and activities of much greater
consequence.31 It may well be that such views are not without foundation,
and that, if military matters were not so completely surrounded with an air
of mystery and the notion encouraged by those in charge that they are too
deep to be understood by the civilian mind,32 compulsory military training
in colleges would definitely appear to be clearly unreasonable in the sense that
it has no reasonable relation to the policy to be subserved. However, these
are matters that must be left to public opinion for correction, if correction is
needed. In the instant case the court, as we have said, was not given the
opportunity on the issues to consider the expediency of the ROTC plan.
C. Z. B.
Divorce-Effect of Decree Prohibiting Remarriage. Plaintiff brought
suit in equity in the District of Columbia alleging that she was the widow of
Daniel Loughran, Jr., deceased, whose estate was beneficiary of the trust in
question. Plaintiff originally had been married to Henry Daye in the District
of Columbia but had there been divorced by him in 1924 on the grounds of
adultery, and under the Code of the District was prohibited from remarrying.
Plaintiff, however, married Loughran in Florida in 1926, after both parties
had lived there for over two years, but later, in 1929, obtained a divorce
from him a mensa et thoro in Virginia. She sought to enforce in the District
of Columbia, as Loughran's widow, certain rights in the nature of dower and
to recover unpaid alimony. Held, that a statute of the domicile forbidding
remarriage of a spouse has only territorial effect and does not invalidate a
marriage solemnized in another State in conformity with the laws thereof,
29 This presumption extends to both reasonableness of purpose and the reasonable
character of the relation between the statute or ordinance and the policy to be subserved.
See Terrace v. Thompson (1923), 263 U. S. 197, 44 S. Ct. 15; Mack v. Westbrook
(1919), 148 Ga. 690, 98 S. E. 339; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist (1920), 128
Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141; Ex Parte Farb (1918), 178 Cal. 592, 174 P. 320; Union Fisher-
men's Co-Operative Packing Co. v. Shoemaker (1921), 98 Or. 659, 194 P. 854; Lawton
v. Steele (1894), 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499.
30 Literary Digest, Dec. 15, 1934, at 7.
31 Ibid.
32 Chicago Tribune (editorial), Weds., Jan. 2, 1935.
